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Abstract 
Bid protests are increasing, and the effectiveness for protestors is relatively high. Bid 
protests delay receipt of needed goods and services. They are costly to prevent and to 
adjudicate. The purpose of this research is to better understand why bid protests are lodged 
by interested parties. This research concentrates on meso-level factors controlled by the 
acquisition team that affect the receipt of a bid protest, namely, the characteristics of the 
procurement, acquisition strategy decisions, and human factors. Using an existing data set 
of 240 government source selections resulting from a survey of U.S. Navy contracting 
officials, 19 antecedent factors will be explored. 
Introduction 
A central tenet of a public contracting system is to maintain the public’s trust via 
instilled integrity, fairness, and openness (Hawkins et al., 2016). A bid protest is a corrective 
mechanism to ensure integrity and fairness by providing an interested party with a process 
to air complaints and obtain relief (Manuel & Schwartz, 2011). It is a written objection that 
can occur at any stage of the contract award process. Often, protests result from alleged 
errors or mistakes committed by the buying agency. The most common errors cited in 
protests are poorly written or vague contract requirements, failure to follow the process or 
evaluation criteria laid out in the request for proposals, unequal treatment of offerors, and 
failure to adequately document the record (GAO, 2014). Said errors can result in unfair 
discrimination against an offeror, and thus, lost business. Nevertheless, offerors also protest 
for opportunistic reasons such as to increase revenue, harm competitors, obtain competitive 
intelligence, prospect for protest viability, and negotiate a subcontract award (Maser & 
Thompson, 2010).  
Bid protests have become a substantial aspect of government procurement (Cibinic 
et al., 2011). In 2016, 2,621 protests were received by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO; 2016), double the number received in 2008 (Arena et al., 2018). This number trended 
steeply upward from 2007–2011, then levelled. “From FY2008–FY2014 total government 
spending, adjusted for inflation, decreased 25% while total protests increased 45%” 
(Schwartz & Manuel, 2015, p. 8). Thus, protests as a percentage of protest opportunities 
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(i.e., awarded contract actions) increased from 0.16% in 2008 to 0.26% in 2016 (Arena et 
al., 2018). Of those protest cases that made it to a decision from 2009–2014 (i.e., the few 
that were not dismissed, settled, or withdrawn), only 17% were sustained, but an average of 
42% of all protest cases were effective (either sustained or resulted in corrective action 
taken by the buying agency prior to a decision). The effectiveness rate for 2017 grew to 47% 
(GAO, 2017).  
Acquisition officials and end users loathe the receipt of a bid protest (Hawkins et al, 
2016). The potential to receive a bid protest drives agencies to incur transaction costs to (1) 
prevent a protest by thoroughly documenting and substantiating proposal evaluations and 
trade-off decisions (Hawkins et al., 2016), (2) defend against an actual protest lodged 
(NASPO, 2013), and (3) take corrective actions. Responding to a protest requires the 
agency to generate a statement of facts and a memorandum of law, and to gather all of the 
pertinent supporting documents such as the solicitation, evaluations, proposals, and so 
forth, for distribution to the GAO and, in some cases, the protestor’s legal counsel 
(Rumbaugh, 2010). The GAO resolves 70% of cases within 60 days, but consumes 90–100 
days resolving the remaining 30%, which are complex cases (Arena et al., 2018). At best, 
an agency’s voluntary corrective action means the competition is reopened, and proposals 
are allowed to be revised, necessitating further evaluations and delaying the contract award. 
At worst, an authority such as the GAO or Court of Federal Claims (COFC) sustains the 
protest, meaning that the procurement process must often start anew. This adds even more 
time and delays the receipt of needed goods and services, resulting in significant rework. 
The end users bear costs as well since their requirements are delayed or go unfulfilled. Bid 
protests are such a persistent concern that the U.S. federal government recently proposed 
legislation to impose a $350 filing fee to dissuade frivolous protests (Poling, 2016), and the 
GAO, for the first time ever, temporarily banned a frequent protestor, Latvian Connection, 
from federal contract awards (Mlinarchik, 2016). Congress took a step further in its 
Conference Report for the fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 
which included a pilot program to test the effects of an unsuccessful protestor paying the 
government’s protest processing costs. Additionally, federal government agencies (Camm et 
al., 2012) and Congress (Arena et al., 2018) continue to commission studies to understand 
and mitigate problems. Furthermore, state governments are not immune to the public’s 
concern for fair tendering; thus, they commissioned research of their own (Molenaar & Tran, 
2015).  
While some research downplays the impact of protests by emphasizing their 
relatively rare occurrence (Arena et al., 2018; Gordon, 2013), the buyer’s reaction to the bid 
protest system is to apply extraordinary effort to defend acquisitions against a protest. 
Measures taken to avoid protests include (1) added layers of reviewers and legal counsel to 
scrutinize every document (and revision thereto) of the source selection record, (2) added 
procurement lead time, (3) conducting additional rounds of discussions to allow offerors an 
opportunity to rectify weaknesses and deficiencies rather than eliminating them from the 
competitive range, (4) unnecessarily retaining offerors in the competitive range, (5) awarding 
more contracts than intended, (6) modifying existing contracts rather than conducting full-
and-open source selections, (7) shopping requirements to existing contracts for task order 
awards rather than conducting a full-and-open source selection, (8) utilizing a more 
objective, price-based source selection method such as LPTA rather than a full trade-off, (9) 
increasing the size of the acquisition team, and (10) offering more extensive debriefings. 
Furthermore, practitioners continue to devise procedures to mitigate protests (Curry, 2018; 
Finkenstadt & Hawkins, 2016). Together, efforts during source selections amount to an 
average $235,000 of transaction costs each, or 7.7% of the contract value (Hawkins et al., 
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2016). These burdens and costs are not trivial, which suggests that the bid protest system 
will continue to be controversial.  
Periodically, the GAO publishes a list of common infractions leading to sustained 
protests. Such micro-level factors include a failure to follow the solicitation evaluation 
criteria; inadequate documentation of the record; unequal treatment of offerors; and 
unreasonable price or cost evaluation (GAO, 2014). Certain meso-level systemic 
characteristics could facilitate these micro-level mistakes. Surprisingly, however, few studies 
have examined the meso-level factors pertaining to the structure of an acquisition, the 
context of the procurement, and human factors. One study by Maser and Thompson (2010) 
found that protests are more likely in cases of (1) more bidders, (2) smaller bidders, (3) a 
high value of the protested contract as a percentage of the protestor’s revenue, (4) contracts 
with long delivery times (i.e., extended lock-outs), (5) buying services, and (6) international 
winners. But what other strategy decisions are being made by the acquisition team that 
contribute to an offeror’s decision to protest? Other factors could include the source 
selection method applied, whether oral presentations are conducted, whether sufficient 
procurement lead time is allotted, whether discussions were conducted, the size of the 
acquisition team, and the experience level of personnel involved. Further, do characteristics 
of the procurement affect an offeror’s decision to protest?  
In addition to the very practical utility of unveiling factors that may reduce or increase 
bid protests, perhaps greater value from investigating this line of logic is the extension of 
inter-organizational justice theory to pre-award supplier selection (i.e., not just pertaining to 
managing established post-award supplier relations). After all, a bid protest is purportedly a 
manifestation of a supplier’s perceived injustice. Heretofore, justice theory applied to inter-
organizational contexts is scant (Liu et al., 2012) and has ignored a challenging stage of 
supplier relationships— relationship initiation (Dwyer et al., 1987). However, the intersection 
of justice expectations and a competitive supplier selection presents a “sticky” situation in 
need of clarity.  
This research, backed by quantitative data, seeks to bridge this gap. In doing so, all 
business-to-business/business-to-government (B2B/B2G) relationships stand to benefit by a 
better understanding of the specific phenomena leading to more efficient and effective 
supplier relationship formation (i.e., less perceived injustice and conflict).  
Research Questions and Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to better understand why bid protests are lodged by 
interested parties. An objective is to identify various meso-level decisions and actions of 
buy-side acquisition teams that affect the receipt of a bid protest. Another objective is to 
seek extensions to inter-organizational justice theory based on the findings. The following 
research questions (RQ) will be explored: 
 RQ1: What characteristics of a procurement affect whether a bid protest is 
received? 
 RQ2: What acquisition strategy variables/decisions affect whether a bid protest is 
received? 
 RQ3: What human factors contribute to receipt of a bid protest? 
 RQ4: Are the pertinent theories surrounding inter-organizational exchange 
complete, and if not, what extensions should be considered?  
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Research Scope 
This research examines only sources of bid protests attributable to buying 
organizations. The scope excludes examining non-buyer sources of bid protests such as 
those lodged for reasons other than buyer action or inaction. Allegedly, it is common for 
businesses to protest a contract award due to business strategy reasons such as to buy 
more time (i.e., revenue) on a service contract as an incumbent, to gain another chance to 
secure an otherwise lost business opportunity, or to disadvantage a competitor in some 
way.  
The remainder of this research is organized as follows. First, the relevant literature is 
surveyed raising a conceptual framework and proposed hypotheses. Next, the the research 
design and methodology are explained. Then, the study provides an analysis of the 
proposed models and reports the findings. Lastly, the study offers a summary discussion, 
offers implications for theory and practice, and concludes with study limitations and logical 
and useful vectors for future research. 
Literature Review 
Bid Protest Evolution and Diffusion 
The U.S. government’s bid protest system evolved as a means to ensure fairness to 
taxpayers, whose resources should not be wasted, and to suppliers that relied upon the 
government for business. Its origin traces to the Tucker Act of 1887; thereby, the 
government waived its sovereign immunity, allowing it to be sued in certain contractual 
matters (Arena et al., 2018). The U.S. Government Accounting Office was created in 1921 
(Arena et al., 2018) and began hearing bid protests shortly thereafter, with the first recorded 
decision in 1925 (Gordon, 2013). Eventually, the courts also gained jurisdiction to hear 
protests, currently the Court of Federal Claims. An underlying theory of the bid protest 
system is equity; private firms should have an equivalent chance to secure government 
contracts (Arena et al., 2018). For protests filed at the GAO, relief is restricted to interested 
parties—those firms deemed to have direct economic interest (Cibinic et al., 2011) by being 
in a position for contract award given a sustained protest decision (Edwards, 2006). 
Bid protest systems for the deterence and relief of injustice are not unique to the U.S. 
federal government. Their effectiveness in fostering integrity and fairness is so recognized 
that protests became part of international trade through forums such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, World Trade Organization, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, and the European Union (Gordon, 2013). Nothwithstanding, most 
U.S. state governments allow for administrative bid protests without having to resort directly 
to a lawsuit (NASPO, 2013).  
Justice Theory 
Because of its importance, justice is receiving increased academic attention (Kaynak 
et al., 2015). Perceived (in)justice affects key outcomes such as trust, satisfaction, 
commitment, and unethical behaviors (Greenberg, 1990) and has been positively associated 
with alliance profitability (Beugre & Acar, 2008). Of the three dimensions of justice, 
distributive justice dominated early work. Distributive justice represents an individual’s 
assessment of the distribution of outcomes (Gilliland, 1993). Interested parties often seek to 
ensure that outcomes are distributed among the parties fairly. Commonly, the basis of those 
assessments is equity—a comparison of an individual’s own get versus give ratio versus 
that of a referent. When this investment-to-outcome ratio is approximately equal among 
parties, justice is perceived, and vice versa. An inequity results in decreased satisfaction 
and often a search for alternatives.  
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Similar to findings in organizational theory (Gilliland, 1993; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut 
& Walker, 1975), channel members expect to be treated fairly, a dimension referred to as 
procedural justice. “Procedural fairness is the glue that holds the relationship together” 
(Kumar, 1996, p. 104). It has been found to be more important than distributive justice 
(Gilliland, 1993). Procedural justice increases knowledge sharing, continuous commitment, 
and relationship investment, which, in turn, increase buyer–supplier relationship 
performance (Liu et al., 2012).  
Procedures are seen as just when they include the following six principles: (1) 
bilateral communication, (2) impartiality (equal opportunity), (3) refutability, (4) explanation, 
(5) familiarity, and (6) respect (Kumar, 1996). Other important aspects of procedural justice 
include the following: consistent decisions based on accurate information, consideration of 
the ethical values of affected individuals, and outcomes that could be modified 
(Leventhal,1980). A nuance of procedural justice concerns the treatment of affected 
individuals while enacting a decision—a phenomenon termed interactional justice (Bies & 
Moag, 1986). Not only is the content of a decision important, but so is the way in which it is 
communicated. Affected people’s justice perceptions are affected by whether they receive 
an explanation for a decision (i.e., justification), and whether they are respected and not 
treated rudely (i.e., treated well).  
Inter-organizational justice has been defined as “boundary spanners’ perceptions of 
the fairness of each other’s actions in interorganizational relationships” (Beugre & Acar, 
2008, p. 452). Inter-organizational justice during sourcing processes is important due to its 
effect on relationship continuity (Kaynak et al., 2015). In procurement, justice or fairness has 
been examined in relation to many essential processes such as supplier selection (Plank et 
al., 1994), inspection and acceptance (Plank et al., 1994), dispute resolution (Lu et al., 
2017), post-award negotiations of changes (Lu et al., 2017), forecast information sharing 
(Blancero & Ellram, 1997), and supplier performance evaluation (Blancero & Ellram, 1997; 
Hawkins & Gravier, 2016), to name a few. 
A common thread across inter-organizational justice theory and social exchange 
theory is communication. Most of the aforementioned principles pertain in some way to 
communication. The theory of channel communication might be instructive (Blancero & 
Ellram, 1997; Mohr & Sohi, 1995), but pertains to ex post versus ex ante relationship 
formation. Very little research addresses the essential elements of communication during 
relationship formation, and particularly the interplay of these communication elements with 
perceptions of justice. Therefore, the focus here entails supplier selection prior to 
relationship formation.  
Many of the meso-level factors predicting bid protests should focus on the seminal 
effects of buyer–supplier communication. As such, this research addresses how the 
structural design of the acquisition process either hinders or facilitates the communication of 
expectations, explanations of decisions, respect, disagreement, and opportunity. Pertinent 
factors can be organized as characteristics of the procurement, acquisition strategy 
components, and human factors.  
Characteristics of the Procurement 
It has been suggested that when revenue is at stake, incumbents who are 
unsuccessful offerors on the follow-on contract source selection are likely to protest (Arena 
et al., 2018). We also know that protests increase as the contract value as a proportion of 
the offeror’s total revenue increases (Maser & Thompson, 2010). Similarly, requirement 
criticality represents the level of contribution an acquired good or service makes to the 
requiring activity’s mission (Kraljic, 1983). When goods and services are critically important, 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 256 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
the requiring activity is likely to have a persistent need. This means that not only is the 
revenue and profit of the current requirement at stake, but so is that of future, repeat 
procurements. Offerors may protest so as to not lose out on the promise of persistent 
income. Thus, it is expected that:  
H1: There will be a positive relationship between dollar value of the proposed 
contract and receipt of a bid protest.  
H2: There will be a positive relationship between criticality of the requirement 
and receipt of a bid protest.  
Maser and Thompson (2010) found that protests are more likely in cases of procured 
services versus goods. The more difficult the definition of requirements (i.e., the 
communication of all expectations and performance levels), the more likely the buyer’s 
evaluation team will misunderstand the proposed value offering. Hence, an overly strict 
evaluation criterion rating, a weakness, or a deficiency could be undeservingly assigned to 
the offeror’s proposal. Similarly, the more intangible the service or its outcome, the more 
likely the buyer will omit a specification or inadequately define it for offerors. Thus, offerors 
may not adequately address a true underlying, yet undescribed, need. The mis-evaluation of 
poorly or under-specified needs may raise perceptions of procedural injustice. Therefore, it 
is posited that: 
H3: The type of value procured will be associated with receipt of a bid protest.  
Protest risk has been found to be a significant predictor of fear of protest (Hawkins et 
al., 2016). Protest risk represents the product of the probability of receiving a bid protest and 
the magnitude of the consequences of receiving a protest. As previously discussed, 
negative consequences could include delayed receipt of needed goods and services, added 
effort of a source selection team increasing transaction costs, litigation costs such as bid 
and proposal costs, contract termination for convenience costs, potential shame and 
embarrassment to the acquisition team, and even adverse personnel action to those 
committing errors.  
Not all acquisitions are equally susceptible to protest. For instance, a 10-year, multi-
billion-dollar, unique service contract (e.g., cloud computing or cybersecurity) will have 
higher odds of being protested than a similar single-year contract due to its dollar amount, 
duration, and associated compounding reputational effects. Neither are the consequences 
of a protest the same for each acquisition. For example, redoing an evaluation of three 
proposals entails less transaction costs than that of 14. Similarly, redoing evaluations 
involving four evaluation criteria entails less transaction costs than that involving 20. Further, 
delaying the award of a $5 billion acquisition would likely cost the buyer more than that of a 
$2,000 acquisition. In terms of justice theory, where the distribution of negative 
consequences is unbalanced between buyer and seller or between competing offerors, 
protest risk should increase. Where the product of protest probability and magnitude of 
consequences is large, a protest is more likely. Thus, it is posited that: 
H4: There will be a positive relationship between protest risk and receipt of a 
bid protest.  
Acquisition Strategy Variables/Decisions 
Government source selections take time. But, agencies, in their acquisition 
processes, should not consume too much time, thereby dissuading the best firms from 
participating in the government market (Edwards, 2006). Sometimes, the allotted 
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procurement lead time is limited in order to receive the goods and services when needed, 
and sometimes proper advance planning does not occur necessitating expedited sourcing. It 
is logical that when the myriad of tasks associated with source selection are rushed, 
mistakes may occur. Likewise, the insufficiency of planned procurement lead time has been 
found to increase the fear of protest (Hawkins et al., 2016). Ill-suited procurement lead time 
may signal to offerors that their proposals have not been thoroughly or fairly evaluated or 
that reasonable and legitimate trade-off decisions have been made and documented; thus, 
perceptions of procedural justice may suffer. It is thus posited that: 
H5: There will be a negative relationship between sufficiency of planned 
procurement lead time and receipt of a bid protest.  
Various methods are available to source selection teams to evaluate offers and 
choose between them. The three best value methods mentioned in FAR Part 15 include a 
full trade-off (FT), a price-past performance trade-off (PPT), and the low-price, technically-
acceptable (LPTA) method. The FT method allows for trade-offs between price and non-
price factors. Hence, using a FT method, a buyer is permitted to pay more for higher 
performance. In contrast, under a LPTA method, non-price factors are evaluated as 
acceptable or unacceptable. Once proposals are deemed acceptable on each non-price 
evaluation criterion, the award decision defaults to the low-price offer. Therefore, a binary 
rating of acceptable or unacceptable under an LPTA method is, in general, easier to defend 
than is an ordered-categorical-scale rating (e.g., outstanding, good, acceptable, marginal, 
unacceptable). Further, making and justifying trade-offs between such categorical ratings 
and price poses challenges in order to withstand scrutiny. For example, how outstanding 
does an offer need to be to warrant paying a 5% higher price? 
Qualitative evidence suggests that contracting officers believe that their choice of 
source selection method can affect the receipt of a bid protest, and that this impacted their 
decision (Arena et al., 2018; Gordon, 2013). The LPTA method, due to its lower subjectivity, 
is more easily defendable and is less prone to errors than is the FT method. Under an FT 
method, multiple criteria and multiple evaluators could invite dissonance in evaluations 
among team members of the meaning of criteria, and could invite the subliminal use of 
unstated evaluation criteria that, arguably, needed to have been in the solicitation. 
Evaluations conducted contrary to the process prescribed in the solicitation can raise 
perceptions of procedural injustice by offerors. In several cases, an LPTA source selection 
has been used or suggested explicitly as a means of avoiding a bid protest (Pocock, 2009; 
Schwartz & Manuel, 2015). As such, it is posited that:  
H6: There will be a negative relationship between source selection method 
appropriateness and receipt of a bid protest.  
H7: The LPTA source selection method will be negatively associated with 
receipt of a bid protest.  
Bid protests have been associated with socio-economic status (Maser & Thompson, 
2010). Small businesses account for most protests at the GAO (53%) and at the COFC 
(58%) (Arena et al., 2018). Maser and Thompson (2010) posited that small businesses are 
more likely to protest than are large businesses, and further, that small businesses 
commonly protest other small businesses’ contract awards. Given that protests are related 
to the procurement’s proportion of the offeror’s revenue (Maser & Thompson, 2010), this 
proportion will be higher for small businesses. Thus, it is posited that:  
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H8: There will be a positive relationship between a small business set-aside 
and receipt of a bid protest. 
The acquisition strategy encompasses the source selection method but is more 
broad. It also entails such components as the contract type, milestones, team members, 
team size, evaluation criteria, contract duration, incentives, options, number of contracts, 
contract line item structure, price and cost analysis method, contract clauses and solicitation 
provisions, and payments method—to name a few. The extent to which these components 
of strategy do not fit the procurement could invite errors in the evaluation of proposals. As 
such, it is posited that:  
H9: There will be a negative relationship between acquisition strategy 
appropriateness and receipt of a bid protest.  
In source selection, often all technical evaluators are not involved in the 
determination of evaluation criteria or in the definition of their meaning. Furthermore, often, 
technical evaluators are not versed in the nuances of the rules of proposal evaluation and 
bid protests (Molenaar & Tran, 2015). Criteria that should have been in the solicitation but 
were omitted, for whatever reason, can by mistake or otherwise, inappropriately creep into 
the evaluation. A failure to follow the stated evaluation criteria is cited as a leading cause of 
sustained protests (GAO, 2014). Evaluation comments and proposal critiques that are useful 
in discriminating between offers can, therefore, be discouraged by review committees and 
legal counsel (Arena et al., 2018). The extent to which technical evaluator’s evaluations are 
sanitized by reviewers should mitigate procedural injustices, and therefore, protests. Thus,  
H10: There will be a negative relationship between compromised technical 
evaluations and receipt of a bid protest.  
Often, source selection teams are rushed by aggressive milestones for contract 
award. One way to reduce procurement lead time is to bypass discussions (i.e., negotiations 
or, more often, the resolution of weaknesses and deficiencies in proposals). In order to 
award a contract without discussions, the contracting officer must notify offerors in the 
solicitation of the intent to award without discussions, making it a deliberate acquisition 
strategy decision. Rushing the process and forgoing an opportunity to fully understand each 
aspect of each proposal might invite errors to the evaluations. Additionally, one aspect of 
procedural justice is to afford individuals an opportunity to impact the decision process (e.g., 
proposal evaluations) or offer input (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Forgoing discussions denies 
such input. Thus, it is posited that:  
H11: There will be a positive relationship between intent to award without 
discussions and receipt of a bid protest.  
On the other hand, discussions entail strict procedural rules ripe for errors. For 
example, discussing one aspect of a proposal with one offeror and failing to check the same 
with each other offeror (e.g., past performance reference relevance in terms of type of work, 
location, or weather) could be a protestable offense (Wallace, 2018). The unequal treatment 
of offerors was cited as a leading cause of sustained protests (GAO, 2014). If discussions 
are opened, the procurement becomes substantially more error-prone due to the strict 
procedures and documentation required. Inadequate documentation is cited as a leading 
cause of sustained bid protests (GAO, 2014; Wallace, 2018). For this reason, discussions 
are sometimes avoided by contracting officers (Gordon, 2013). As such,  
H12: There will be a positive relationship between conducting discussions and 
receipt of a bid protest.  
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Oral presentations constitute the submission of proposal information orally (Edwards, 
2006). Oral presentations were codified in the FAR in concert with the rewrite of Part 15 in 
1997 as a tool to streamline the source selection process and to improve pre-award 
communications between offerors and the government (Hannaway, 2000). Oral 
presentations facilitate communication from the offeror of its understanding of the work, its 
capabilities (Edwards, 2006), its past performance, and its technical approach (Rumbaugh, 
2010). This explanation should enhance evaluators’ understanding of the proposals 
resulting in more accurate evaluations and ratings (e.g., proposal risk). Indeed, explanation 
and bilateral communication are among the six principles of the theory of justice (Kumar, 
1996).  
On the other hand, oral presentations add one more step to a complicated evaluation 
process (i.e., more opportunity to make a mistake). Specifically, entertaining oral 
presentations without opening discussions means that source selection team members, in 
their communications, must be careful not to allow an offeror to revise its proposal—even 
orally (Cibinic et al., 2011; Edwards, 2006). Of course, this requires a perfect knowledge of 
each element of an offeror’s written proposal in order to recognize whether any statement 
made during an oral presentation constitutes a change to any prior written or oral proposal 
submission. Obviously, prospective contracts with expansive or complicated scopes of work 
can render such perfect knowledge untenable. Proposal revisions may inadvertently be 
made. Consider also that salespeople naturally want to satisfy evaluators (i.e., avoid 
negative ratings or perceptions of weaknesses); thus, changes to proposals can be difficult 
to avoid as salespeople can sense evaluators’ concerns by either non-verbal cues or by the 
ensuing line of questioning. Given the aforementioned conflicting arguments to the benefit or 
harm of an oral presentation, no directional claim is made.  
H13: There will be a relationship between the use of oral presentations and 
receipt of a bid protest.  
The GAO (2014) repeatedly cites inadequate documentation of the record as a chief 
culprit of sustained bid protests. Poor documentation could include contradictions in the 
records and omissions of details needed to justify ratings and trade-off decisions. 
Documents relied upon during proposal evaluations include the source selection decision 
document, comparative analysis of proposals, evaluation notices to offerors, source 
selection plan, debriefing scripts, technical evaluations, past performance evaluations, cost 
or price analyses, rating charts, and evaluation briefing charts. Additionally, protest 
probability has been qualitatively associated with source selection document scrutiny (Arena 
et al., 2018). The purpose of the scrutiny is to avoid a protest. Thus, logic holds that more 
revisions reduce errors and thereby lower the chances of receiving a bid protest. Added 
scrutiny entails often multiple acquisition team members poring over all of the documents to 
prevent errors such as those cited by the GAO— unequal treatment of offerors and following 
the evaluation process and criteria per the RFP. As such, it is posited that: 
H14: There will be a negative relationship between the number of source 
selection document revisions and receipt of a bid protest.  
In order to appease otherwise unsuccessful offerors and thwart a protest, contracting 
officers will sometimes award more contracts than planned. In essence, the work gets split 
among two or more contractors so that there are no losers. For example, building, fielding, 
and sustaining two varieties of Littoral Combat Ship platforms substantially increased costs 
relative to doing so for a single platform (O’Rourke, 2014) but mitigated the threat of a 
protest. Thus,  
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H15: There will be a negative relationship between increased actual number of 
contracts awarded versus that intended and receipt of a bid protest.  
Qualitative evidence suggests that contracting officers adjust the chosen type of 
contract to the probability of a protest (Arena et al., 2018). More complicated contract types 
(e.g., cost reimbursement) entail more complicated cost analyses that are prone to 
controversy and error (e.g., should-cost analysis). Prior research found that cost plus-type 
contracts are more likely to be protested (Maser & Thompson, 2010). Thus, it is posited that: 
H16: Contract type will be associated with receipt of a bid protest. 
Acquisition officials exercise judgment in assigning an appropriate amount of 
resources to conduct a source selection. They must consider evaluators’ availabilities, 
expertise, and location. Potential resources are balanced with the task demands such as the 
award milestones, required travel, quantity of expected proposals, and quantity of evaluation 
factors and sub-factors (Edwards, 2006). For source selections with higher protest risk, 
acquisition officials may assign more evaluators and other team members and for a larger 
portion of their time. Logically, more people and more effort should mitigate protest-worthy 
mistakes. More resources can be indicated by transaction costs, determined by the number 
of full-time equivalent personnel working on the source selection. Therefore, 
H17: There will be a negative relationship between transaction costs and 
receipt of a bid protest. 
Human Factors 
Fear of protest describes the level of apprehension a contracting professional has 
about receiving a bid protest (Hawkins et al., 2016). It follows that in cases in which 
contracting officers are worried about a protest, the acquisition team will take added 
measures to prevent a protest. Thus, it is posited that:  
H18: There will be a negative relationship between fear of protest and receipt 
of a bid protest.  
The RAND Corporation’s study of bid protests revealed that industry representatives 
question the competency of the acquisition workforce, citing a need for additional training 
(Arena et al., 2018). Additionally, source selection experience has been found to reduce fear 
of protest (Hawkins et al., 2016). Experience appears to yield confidence in the compliance 
of the procurement process. Training and education may also provide the necessary 
awareness of the myriad of laws, regulations, and case law—any of the peculiarities of 
which could jeopardize a procurement. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that:  
H19: There will be a negative relationship between experience and receipt of a 
bid protest.  
Combined, this set of hypotheses should help predict bid protests. The conceptual 
mode (Figure 1) is sufficiently comprehensive to enable practitioners to determine needed 
definitive action to improve the effectiveness of their source selections.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
 
Methodology 
The purpose of this research was to identify factors associated with the receipt of bid 
protests. This study examines a unique, rich data set of 350 government source selections 
resulting from a survey of U.S. Navy contracting officials. The data went beyond that of 
typical protest research that relies on summary-level contract award data from FPDS-NG 
and GAO’s Electronic Protest Docketing System. Rather, the data set includes unique 
insights from those involved in the source selection, including perceptions (e.g., source 
selection method appropriateness) and objective data elements not captured elsewhere 
(e.g., intent to award without discussions). Given the exploratory nature of the research, a 
backward stepwise logistic regression model will be applied to the data.  
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Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for this data is a U.S. federal government source selection. Since 
many bid protests stem from a protestable action associated with a source selection (e.g., a 
proposal rating, rating justification, or basis of a trade-off analysis), this is the proper unit of 
analysis for the study. The data pertained to source selections conducted pursuant to FAR 
Part 15; those conducted using simplified acquisition procedures and task order 
competitions will be excluded.  
Data 
The data set included 350 records of source selections. Many records were omitted 
from this analysis due to missing data and conflicting data. Five records reported zero PALT, 
which is not possible. Another 32 records reported PALT less than 45 days. While the 
original survey instructed respondents to complete the survey pertaining to a FAR Part 15 
source selection, some respondents may have reported on task order competitions. Due to 
advertising requirements (15 days), proposal preparation time (30 days), and time for 
evaluations, FAR Part 15 source selections should consume at least 45 days from receipt of 
a complete requirements package. Also, 15 records either included no dollar value or a 
value that was less than the simplified acquisition threshold ($150,000—meaning FAR Part 
13 procedures or task order procedures were more likely). Finally, 66 records did not include 
sufficient transaction cost data to determine full-time equivalents. Together, for the sake of 
complete data and consistency of source selection rules, these 110 records were removed, 
leaving a data set of 240 records for analysis.  
Summary 
This research offers a first step toward quantitative, transaction-level investigation 
into reasons for bid protests. While no one can prevent an interested party from filing a bid 
protest (Rumbaugh, 2010), the factors identified herein can help acquisition managers 
hedge against the likelihood. This research will explore 19 meso-level antecedent factors 
that can be categorized as characteristics of the procurement, acquisition strategy 
decisions, and human factors. Based on the exploratory findings, the research will draw 
implications for theory and practice, and chart promising directions for future research into 
this important stream of acquisition research.  
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